Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hadn’t intended to make

an opening comment, but I think several observations are in order

after the last statement.

One of the great ironies and observations of congressional politics

is that the minority side is criticizing a Speaker who supported

their President and their position, and that strikes me as awkward.

Second at issue, because the word ‘‘Cold War’’ has been raised,

is the policies that are in place having nothing to do with who is

making the policies, having nothing to do with how one side or the

other perceives those policies. But we are in the process at this

very moment of looking at a situation in Kosovo where we may

well be a thwarted United States of America, and conceivably stalemated

in such a way that we will have raised the enmity of many

around the world in the developing world, but most poignantly, in

Russia and in China. We are in the process of looking at a ‘‘hot

war’’ that we are not doing as well in as anyone in America would

like and precipitating two new ‘‘Cold Wars.’’

That has nothing to do with any of the issues that this Congress

is talking about in how we approach Russia or China, but simply

to do with the ramifications of the hot war in Kosovo; and we, as

a Congress, have to be very cognizant of that, and the Administration

has to be cognizant of it. In fact, it could be that the two new

Cold Wars that are being precipitated in potential may be more

significant than the hot war itself in Kosovo; and these are the

ramifications of the well-intended but perhaps counterproductive

policy for which there is no aspect of partisan observations, simply

an observation of what are the facts in the field.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Would the gentleman yield?

I apologize for taking the Chair’s time, but just one

observation: There are times that bipartisanship should imply a

greater amount of unity. There are also times when the greatest

reflection in world affairs of a Congress and an American people

working together is to show differences of judgment. When all of

this is over in Kosovo, I think it is going to be extraordinarily

healthy that the world is going to see a Congress with a panoply

of judgment.

It is the gentleman’s time.

I certainly would like to probe further this personal

position of yours that you are an advocate of standing up to Congress

and the Administration. Let me tell you, as someone who

once worked at the Department of State, I am a very strong advocate

of the Department of State, but I am not an advocate of the

foreign policy that is being precipitated at this time by this Department

of State. It is very serious, and I would like to read back a

sentence of yours, or two sentences.

You state, ‘‘To my mind anti-Americanism in Russia is less about

us and more about them. It is a tool for attacking Western-style institutions

and above all democracy itself.’’ I will tell you if that is

what you are saying in the Department of State, you are

misreading Russia profoundly as the Ambassador in charge of relations

with Russia.

What is happening in Russia today is a profound reflection of

Russian history and Russian attitudes toward religion. Everybody

knows that they have a circumstance of identifying with the Serbs

because of the Orthodox church. In addition, in 1941, every Russian

believes, the Serbs held up the German army, Operation Barbarossa,

and by that 2-week holdup, German tanks froze outside of

Moscow 3 days before Christmas, and that saved Moscow and possibly

Leningrad. That is the principal reason the Russians totally

identify with Serbia.

It isn’t escapism, that they are being antidemocratic. They are

profoundly opposed to the foreign policy of the United States of

America.

Now, there is a rationalization for that foreign policy, and there

are also reasons not to support that foreign policy, but this type of

escapist rhetoric of judgment precipitated by the Department of

State and the Congress does not represent the highest traditions

of the U.S. Department of State.

Because at the background of this were certain negotiations at

Ramboulliet led by the United States Department of State in which

an agreement was reached, but also in which threats were precipitated.

The Department of State led the movement of suggesting if

Milosevic didn’t agree, we would bomb.

Milosevic didn’t agree. To defend the credibility of the United

States, we then bombed.

I consider that to be an exact reversal of historic 20th century

American diplomacy first articulated by Teddy Roosevelt, which

was to speak softly but carry a big stick. This Department of State

took the reverse position. It spoke sharply and then had to rely

upon a stick that is now perhaps becoming one of the greatest

counterproductive policy mistakes of this century.

I want to ask you, do you believe our diplomacy has served us

well? Do you believe that this is just a passing fad that is being

used as escapism in Russia? Or do you think there is the potential

here for a huge, marked difference in relationships between the

United States and Russia based upon the policy that this Department

of State has led?

I appreciate that. My time has expired. All I can say

is that you have begged the question. The issue is the ramifications

of Kosovo policy on all of this and the public opinion polling, of

which you have chosen one part to note, is very interesting because

it has shown a remarkable turnaround in Russia altitudes toward

the United States over a two-month period of time, a turnaround

of stunning significance that will have enormously damaging impli-

cations for U.S.–Russian relations and, much more importantly, on

the future of Russia itself.

It appears that this Department of State did not weigh that perhaps

as much as it might have as it precipitated certain policies

that appear to be producing very fair results today.

Ambassador SESTANOVICH. Can I add one comment on that, Mr.

Chairman, if I might?

Of course we took those ramifications into account. Our premise

in our relations with Russia is, first, that we have common interests

and we should pursue the kind of integration that I have described;

Second, that where we have disagreements, we can’t paper them

over just because we are afraid the Russians will take it badly. To

the contrary, we have to face up to those disagreements and pursue

policies that are in our interests.

On that basis, we can have a productive relationship with Russia.

General Scowcroft, earlier today I made an observation,

may or may not be valid, but it struck me that from a diplomatic

perspective this Administration had breached a century-long

tradition of Teddy Roosevelt about speaking softly but carrying a

big stick. In doing that, they have also breached a shorter-term policy

of General Scowcroft’s, and let me explain it.

It strikes me that under the Bush Administration, if there is

anything that was a doctrine—and this is a doctrine that to a degree

stems from the President and from his National Security Adviser,

yourself, which is very Chicago school, using your terms of

art, very cold and calculating—it was the Powell Doctrine, which

was to carefully describe objectives and then to apply overwhelming

force if it need be to carry them out.

It strikes me in Kosovo, which has enormous ramifications both

for Russian policy as well as for NATO, we have struck a rather

deep nail into the Powell Doctrine.

Objectives seem to be a bit fuzzy, but more importantly, we have

decided to not prevail; and instead, we have a doctrine of what appears

to me to be punishment, that is, that the policy in place is

very punishing to the Serbs, but may well be a policy not designed

to prevail, which is an extraordinary circumstance in geostrategic

terms, partly because this is a civil war, partly because whether or

not it is a civil war, it is a war, and NATO has now been identified

with this new policy.

One aspect of NATO relates to whether anyone will want to join

if this is the kind of policy that NATO comes to symbolize.

I would like to ask you, as a Chicago school theorist, as well as

a former National Security Adviser, how you assess this policy. Do

you think it is realistic?

I appreciate that, and I would only conclude by saying

I have never known a policy that can be, in my judgment, legitimately

criticized from two perspectives.

Either we should not have made the threats and not gotten involved;

or if we did pursue it, we should have pursued it in a forthcoming

way.